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Preliminary Memo
Conf. of June 12, 1975
List 2, Sheet 1
No. 74-6212

~from ~SDC,

NORTON

D. Md.
Bla1r, D.J.J.7
Winter, C.J., dis.)

~~y,

v.
WEINBERGER, Secretary
of HEW

1.

Timely

Federal/Civil

This is a Weinberger v. Salfi hold which has previously

been remanded for reconsideration in light of Jimenez v. Weinberger,
417

u.s.

628 {1974).

Appellant seeks relief from the provisions of

the Social Security Act which require that he have received support
from his deceased father.

Had appellant lived with his father,

were he his father's legitimate child, or were he an illegitimate

:

-2child meeting a variety of qualifications, he would not be
required to show receipt of support.
2.

FACTS:

parents.

Appellant was born in 1964 to unmarried teenage

His father acknowledged responsibility, and at birth

contributed $6 and some baby habiliments, but never provided

~

~

support.

The father entered the Army shortly thereafter, and

did seek to take out an allotment in appellant's behalf.

However,

the procedure was incomplete at the time of his death in Vietnam.
Appellant then applied for child's insurance benefits, under
42

u.s.c.

§ 402{d);

the application was pursued to the exhaustion

of administrative remedies.

u.s. c.

He thereupon filed suit under 42

§ 40 5 (g) •

Because he sought to enjoin, on constitutional grounds, the
operation of the provisions of the Act which disqualified hjm,
appellant requested a three-judge district court.

The single

district judge (Blair) obliged, but only after first resolving,
adversely, appellant's nonconstitutional claim that he had
been sufficiently supported by his father to meet the statute's
dependency requirements.

Appellant relied chiefly on his

father's efforts to take out an allotment; the court concluded
that the statute plainly required actual support, not intended
support.

See § 402 (d) (3)

(appended to this memo).

The three-judge court (Winter, Murray, Blair) thought it
uncertain that the single judge had had jurisdiction over the

-3-

nonconstitutional claim, since the case required three judges;
it did not reach the issue, however, because it concluded that
the single judge had properly disposed of that claim.

The

court went on to certify the case as a class action, and then
turned to the constitutional issue.

The latter requires a

preliminary description of the relevant statutory provisions.
Section 40 2 (d) provides for benefits for a "dependent"

~·~
•(d) (3) (appended at the end of this memo) deems a child to ~
be dependent upon_E is fathe~f he is a legitimate or adopted ~
child ~f he was living with his father,
if he is a "child"

"child'y

f a deceased or disabled wage earner.

Section 402

o:

by virtue of §§ 416 (h) (2) (B) or 416 (h) (3).

y

The latter two

sections provide for certain exceptions to the general
requirement that status as a "child" be determined by application of state law governing devolution of intestate property
(which excludes illegitimates in many states); the exceptions
are

fo~ose

persons who are illegitimate only because of

defective ceremonial marriages,

o~o

have been acknowledged

in writing, or who have been the beneficiaries of court
paternity or support decrees.

Because petr was in none of

---

-

these categories, he could not be deemed eligible save

-------;-----

'-

b~ a

!_/Section 402(d) (3) also deems a ~hild to be dependent jf he was
receiving support from the wage earner at the time of death; as
has already been noted, appellant failed to establish that he had
been.
(cont.)
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showing of receipt of support -- a showing which the Secretary
and lower courts found him to have failed to make.
The court rejected appellant's contention that the statutory
classifications should be subjected to strict scrutiny, but did
conclude that the "new rational basis approach" of Weber v.

-·on the Jimenez remand, the majority and dissent engaged
in a lengthy and complex discussion of whether a child was
also deemed dependent if it was a "child" by virtue of § 416
(h) (2) (A), which provides for determination of that status by
application of state intestacy laws.
See D. ct. opn, at 11-16,
dissenting opinion, at n. 1. The majority relied on the plain
wording of§ 402{d) (3), while the dissent relied principally
on language in Jimenez, 417 u.s., at 634. That case does
indicate that both the Secretary and the Court assumed that
an illegitimate entitled to inherit is deemed dependent by
virtue of § 416 (h) (2) (A). The issue was not essential to
\
Jimenez, however, and § 416 (h) ( 2) (A) on its face does nothing
more than establish that such a person is a "child."
Section
402 (d) (3) deems to be "dependent" a person who is a "child"
by operation of certain specific sections, not including
§ 416 (h) (2) (A).
The relevance of this issue turns on the lack of rational
relationship between state devolution laws and the likelihood
of an illegitimate's having been dependent on his father.

-5Aetna Casualty Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972), was appropriate.

This

approach was thought to be that of determining statutory purpose,
and then judging whether the challenged classification rationally
served that purpose.

The court also thought, however, that

social welfare legislation could not be surgically precise, so
that some incidental discrimination was permissible.

As for

the Social Security Act, the court stated that it was based on
the dual concepts of parentage and dependency, and that the
dependency involved was actual dependency, not potential.

The

court considered it reasonable for the statute to presume
dependency for legitimate children, for any child living with a

-

father, and for illegitimates who had obtained judicial decrees
of paternity or support.

The presumption of dependency for

those who had been acknowledged in writing was somewhat more
difficult, but the court thought it reasonable to presume that
men are more likely to provide support when they have been
willing to accept responsibility in writing.
Vincent, 401

u.s.

Unlike Labine v.

532 (1971), the statute did not erect an

impenetrable barrier against illegitimates -- they had full
......

opportunity to show the critical element of dependency.
Moreover, the statute really didn't treat equal dependents
unequally, cf., Weber, since all could establish dependency;
rather, it merely established simplified formalistic methods of
proof for reasonably chosen classes of children.

Appellant's

:

-6-

problem was seen

~s

basically that of being outside the class of

persons for whom the Act was designed, to wit, those who received
actual support from a wage earner.
This Court vacated and remanded in light of Jimenez v.
Weinberger, in which was ruled unconstitutional a provision of

~

the Act which barred benefits to illegitimate children born

-

after the onset of their wage earner parent's disability.
majority of the district court
effect on its earlier decision.

conc~uded

The

that Jimenez had no

Its basic point of distinction

was that in Jimenez a particular subclass of illegitimates was
prohibited from even showing dependency, despite the Act's

-

basic purpose of providing support for dependents, whereas here
appellant is not barred from making such a showing.
-...__......

~

~

It noted

'-wa

that Jimenez had not established illegitimacy as a suspect
classification, nor had it cast doubt on the court's understanding of the purpose of the Social Security Act.

Moreover,

the restriction here does not make the statute underinclusive -while it permits benefits for nondependent children falling in
various categories, it does not exclude any child who in fact
was dependent.
Judge Winter, dissenting, acknowledged that Jimenez dealt
with different restrictions, but thought the case "gave strong
and clear indications" that the dependency requirement was also
invalid.

His principal argument was that various references

-7in the opinion supported appellant's contention that the purpose
.
. 1 support. ~ Th1s
Of the Act We r e t o rep 1 ace ac t ua 1 or poten t 1a

being the purpose, proof of paternity alone was sufficient, and
a further showing of support could not be rationally or validly
/

required of subclasses of illegitimates.
3.

CONTENTIONS:

Appellant contends that the purpose of

the Act is to replace actual or potential support, and that the
requirement that an illegitimate who establishes paternity must
also show actual support is thus irrational and arbitrary.

He

also contends that there is no rational or legitimate basis for
discriminating against illegitimate children (especially since
almost as many absent fathers of legitimate children fail to
support their children as do absent fathers of illegitimate
children), and that the case is analogous to Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411

u.s.

677

(1973)

(which struck down a requirement

that dependency on female military personnel be established) •
He contends that illegitimacy should be viewed as a suspect
classification, since illegitimates have been "relegated to
such a position of political powerlessness as to command
extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process."
San Antonio Indep. School Dist v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973).

~He relied,

for example, on the Court's citation to a House-Senate
conference Report; there is language in that report, not quoted in
Jimenez, which speaks of the purpose of the Act in terms of replacjng
obligations of support. Judge Winter also focused on the fact that

-8-

He also preserves - his factual claim that he made an adequate
showing of receipt of support from his father.
4.

DISCUSSION:

The case is a hold for Salfi, both on the

merits and jurisdictionally.

The jurisdictional issues affect

the propriety of class-wide relief and, more importantly, this
Court's appellate jurisdiction.

Note 8 of Justice Rehnquist's

draft opinion in Salfi leaves open the issue of whether a
§ 405(g) court can grant injunctive relief.

If the jurisdictional

portion of the draft is adopted, the present appeal forces that
issue-- if§ 405(g) does not authorize injunctive relief, the
three-judge court was improperly convened and the requirements
for § 1253 appeals are not met (unlike Salfi, § 1252 jurisdiction
is also lacking, since the decision below was in favor of the
statute's validity).
The arguments based on the intent of the Social Security
Act strike me as exceedingly

-

s~range.

They would strike down

the support requirement because of its perceived inconsistency
with an overall statutory purpose which has been divined in
total disregard of the challenged section
makes abundantly clear Congress'

which section

interest in focusing on actual

the applicant in Jimenez was precluded from benefits because he in
fact could not show that he had ever been supported by his father
(since the father was disabled when he was born) -- which is precisely
the problem which appellant faces.

-9support.

To my mind, the only appropriate frame of analysis

looks strictly to whether Congress had a rational basis for
presuming wage earner support as to all classes of children,
legitimate and illegitimate, save for that to which appellant
belongs (unless, of course, the Court treats illegitimacy as
a suspect criterion) •
There is no response.
Jacobs

6/5/75

42

u.s.c.

All opns in petn app.

§ 402 {d) {3)

A child shall be deemed dependent upon his
father or adopting !ather or his mother or adopting
mother at the time specified In paragraph 0) <Cl of
this subsection unless, at such time, such Individual
was not llving with or contributing to the support of
such child and(A} such child is neither the legitimate nor
adopted child of such Individual. or
<Bl such child has been adopted by some other
individual.
For purposes of this paragraph, a child deemed to be
a child of a fully or currently insured Individual
pursuant to section 416<h) <2l <Bl or section 416<hl
<3) of this title shall be deemed to be the legitimate
child of such individual.
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

June 12, 1975

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE

Re:

r

No. 74-6212 - Norton v. Weinberger

~ have taken the liberty of asking Mike Rodak to
relis this case for me at our next Conference, even though
t
re were five votes to note probable jurisdiction limited
to the constitutional question at today's Conference. My
reason for doing so is that the presently circulating draft
opinion in Salfi contains a reservation as to the question of
whether a District Court exercising jurisdiction under§ 205(g)
of the Social Security Act may issue an injunction. If that
drculation does become a Court opinion, there will be presented
on the appeal in Norton the issue as to whether this Court
has jurisdiction under 28 u.s.c. § 1253, since that section
limits our appellate jurisdiction to an action required to be
heard by a three-judge court, and 28 u.s.c. § 2282 requires a
three-judge court only when application is made for an interlocutory or permanent injunction restraining the enforcement
of • • • "any Act of Congress for repugnance to the Constitution of the United States • • • ". This question is presented
in Norton though not in Salfi because in the latter case we
have jurisdict1on under 28 u.s.c. § 1252 because the District
Court there held an Act of Congress unconstitutional. In
Norton the ruling of the three-judge District Court was in
favor of constitutionality, and therefore jurisdiction depends
on 28 u.s.c. § 1253.

- 2 If there is thought to be substance to my view, I think
jurisdiction ought to be postponed in the case, rather than
simply noted.
Sincerely,
v f ' Y \,4/ /
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CHAMBERS OF

..JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN

May 15, 1976

Dear Lewis:
No. 75-649, Mathews v. Mattern, in December
marked as a hold for No. 74-204, Mathews v. Eldridg ,
has now come down, and for No. 74-6212, Norton v. Mathews.
I have written Norton. It is at the Printer, but I propose to
hold it until the companion case is ready. In any event, I doubt
very much that Norton will bear on Mattern.
No. 75-1234, Mathews v. Elliott, at Saturday•s conference was relisted for May 20. I asked that it be relisted with
the Mattern case. My thought is that both bear upon your
Eldridge opinion and that we can get rid of both cases (perhaps
remand for reconsideration in the light of Eldridge) rather than
have them drag on for Norton.
I shall value your comments as to this suggestion. Would
you be able to do this for next Thursday•s conference?
Sincerely,

~~----"
Mr. Justice Powell

cc: The Conference

(

ilt DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STAT:m
(

No, 74-6212

Gregory Norton> Jr,,, etc,,
Appellant,

On Appeal from the United
States District Court for
t he District of MaryF , David Mathews, Secretary
land.
of Health, Education,
a.nd Welfare,

v,

[May -, 1976]
MR. JusTICE BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the
Court,
On the merits, this case raises the same question as
to the constitutionality of §§ 202 (d) (3) and 216 (h)(3)
(C) (ii) of the Social Security Act, 42 U. S. C. §§ 402
(d)(3) and 416 (h)(3)(C)(ii), as was presented in
Mathews v. Lucas, ante, p. - . The present litigation,
however, also raises certain jurisdictional issues. It now
has become apparent that the simultaneous submission
of Lucas to the Court, and our decision in that case
today, make It necessary for us specifically to decide the
jurisdictional questions,
I
Appellant Gregory Norton, Jr., was born out of wedlock in February 1964. Both his father and his mother
then were high school students, a.ged, respectively, 16
and 14, who lived separately at home with their parents.
The two never married and, indeed, never lived together.
Appellant always has resided with his maternal grandmother and has been cared for by her.. When Gregory
was born, his father contributed six dollars and some
clothing and other habiliments for the baby, but, being
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so young and unemployed, he never assumed appellant's
actual support,
In February 1965 the father entered military service.
He was killed in Vietnam on May 19, 1966, at age 19.
Before his death, the father apparently took some initial
steps (the procurement of a birth certificate and other
items) necessary for the processing of a dependent child's
military allotment. The father failed, however, to complete the required procedures before he was killed.
In September 1969 appellant's maternal grandmother
filed on his behalf an application for ~urviving child's
benefits under § 202 (d) (1) of the Act, 4'2 U. S. C. § 402
(d) (1), based on the father's earnings record. An administrative hearing followed. The Hearing Examiner
concluded that appellant was not entitled to benefits as
a dependent child because his father, at the time of his
death, was neither living with appella.n t nor contributing to appellant's support.1 App. 13-19.. The subsequent administrative appeal was no more successful.
ld., 20-21,
Section 202 (d) (1) provides survivorship benefits only to a child
who was "dependent" upon the deceased insured parent at the time
of the parent's den,th . A legitimn,te child, a child entitled under
t.he intestacy laws of the insured parent's domicile to inherit personal property from the parent, a cluld whose illegitimacy results
from a formal defect in his parents' purported marriage ceremony,
and a child acknowledged m writing by the insured father as his
son or daughter or JUdtcially decreed (during the father's lifetime)
to be such, are all deemed under the Act. to be dependent, and
thus are relieved of otherwise p110ving actual dependency. Sections
202 (d) ( 1), 202 (d) (3), 216 (e), 216 (h) (2), and 216 (h) (3) (C),
42 U. S. C §§ 402 (d) (1), 402 (d) (3), 416 (e), 416 (h) (2), and
416 (h) (3) (C). Since appellant did not come within any of these
categories, he could establish his status as a dependent child under
the Act only by showing that his father lived with him or contributed to his support at the time of his death. Sections 202
(d)(3) and 216 (h)(3)(C)(ii), 42 U.S. C. §§402 (d)(3) and 416
(h) (3) (C) (ii) See generally Mathews v. Lucas, wnte, p . - .
1
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The present action was then instituted on behalf of
appellant against the Secretary of Health, Education,
and Welfare. By the complaint, relief was sought alternatively on statutory and constitutional grounds. First,
it was asserted that, by his attempt to secure a military
allotment for appellant, the father, at the time of his
death, in fact was contributing to appellant's support,
within the meaning of § 216 (h) (3) (C) (ii) of the Act,
and that appellant therefore was a dependent of the
father, under §§ 202 (d)(1) and (3), and entitled to
benefits. Second, it was asserted that, by creating a
presumption of dependency, and consequent qualifica.tion
for benefits, for legitimate children generally, and for
illegitimate children under certain circumstances, seen. 1,
but denying the presumption to appellant and others
similarly situated, the Act discriminated against appellant's class, in violation of the guaranty of equal protection implicit in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment.
Appellant's statutory claim was initially considered and
rejected by a single district judge. Norton v. R_ichardson, 352 F. Supp. 596 (Md. 1972). In view of the complaint's request for certification of a class pursuant to
Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23 (c)(1), and for class-wide injunc.
tive relief against the alleged unconstitutional operation
of the Act's presumptions of dependency, a three-judge
court was convened under 28 U. S. C. §§ 2282 and 2284
to pass upon the constitutional claim. The three-judge
court first agreed with, and reaffirmed,, the single judge's
rejection of appellant's statutory claim. Norton v. W einberger, 364 F. Supp. 1117, 1120 (Md. 1973). The court
went on to identify the plaintiff class, id., at 1120-1121, 2
but on the merits of the constitutional claim it ruled in
2

The definition of the class, however, does not appear to have
b een formalized in the three-judge court's judgment. App. 59.

74-6212-0PINION
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favor of the Secretary and granted summary judgment
in his favor. Id., at 1121-1131.
Appellant, taking the position that the 3-judge court
had denied his request for an order enjoining enforcement of provisions of the Act, lodged a direct appeal
here pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1253. While his jurisdictional statement was pending, Jimenez v. Weinberger,
417 U. S. 628 (1974), was decided. This Court thereafter vacated the 3-judge court's judgment and remanded
the case for further consideration in the light of Jimenez.
418 U.S. 902 (1974) .
On the remand, the same 3-judge court, with one judge
now dissenting (adhered to its earlier conclusion in favor
of constitutionality. Norton v. Weinberger, 390 F. Supp.
1084 (Md. 1975). Appellant has again appealed. We
postponed the question of jurisdiction to the hearing of
the case on the merits, 422 U. S. 1054 (1975), and, in
doing so, cited Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U. S. 749, 763 n.
8 (1975), which just then had been decided. Subsequently, we set the case for oral argument with Mathew8
v. Lucas, ante. 423 U. S. 819 (1975).

II
The question whether the 3-judge court was properly
convened upon appellant's demand for injunctive relief
is relevant, of course, to our appellate jurisdiction. If
the court was not empowered to enjoin the operation of
a federal statute, then three judges were not required to
hear the case under 28 U. S. C. § 2282, and this Court
has no jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1253. Accordingly, appellant and the Secretary have debated whether
the District Court possessed injunctive power under§ 205
(g) of the Act, 3 42 U. S. C. § 405 (g), and whether, in
3 Section 205 (b) reads in pertinent part:
" Any individual, after any final decision of the Seeretary made

. 74-6212-0PINION
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the light of § 205 (h)/ 42 U. S. C. § 405 (h), relief was
available under the mandamus statute, 28 U. S. C.
§ 1361," or under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5
U. S. C. § 701 et seq.6
after a hearing to which he was a pa.rty, irrespective of the amount
in controversy, may obtain a review of such decision by a civil
action . . . . Such action shall be brought in the district court
of the United States for the judicial diiitrict in which the plaintiff
resides . . . . As part of his answer the Secretary shall file a
certified copy of the transcript of the record including the evidence
upon which the findings and decision complained of are based. The
court shall have power to enter, upon the pleadings and transcript
of the record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the
decision of the Secretary, with or without remanding the cause for
a rehearing."
4 Section 205 (h) rrads in pertinent part:
"The findings and decisions of the Secretary after a hearing shall
be binding upon all individuals who were parties to such hearing.
No findings of fact or decision of the Secretary shall be reviewed
by any person, tribunal, or governmental agency except as herein
provided. No action against the United States, the Secretary, or
any officer or employer thereof shall be brought under [§ 1331 and
other specified sections] of Title 28 to recover on any claim arising
under this subchapter" [subchapter II of the Social Security Act] .
See Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U. 8. 749, 756 n. 3 (1975) .
5 The initiating judge observed that jurisdiction for his court was
asserted under the general federal question provision of 28 U. S. C.
§1331, and under 28 U. S. C. §1361, vesting the district courts
with junsdiction "in the nature of mandamus to compel an officer
or employee of the United States or any agency thereof to perform
a duty owed to the plamtiff." Norton v. Richardson, 352 F . Supp.
fi96, 598 II. 2 (Md. 19'72) .
6 The SoliCitor General contends that the District Court has jurisdiction to review a social security ruling only under § 205 (g) because § 205 (h) specifically excludes any other source of review of
such dPterminntions. He then contends that, for two reasons, there
was no JUrisdiction here to issue an injunction under § 205 (g).
F1rst, § 205 (g) m terms specifies that a district court rna¥ enter a
judgment only "affirming, modifymg, or reversing the decision of
the Secretary, with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing,"

74-6212-0PINION
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We think it unnecessary, however, to resolve the details of these [ difficult and perhaps close) jurisdictional
arguments. The substantive questions raised on this appeal now have been determined in Matthews v. Lucas,
ante. 7 This disposition renders the merits in the present
case a decided issue and thus one no longer substantial
in the jurisdictional sense.
Assuming that the 3-judge court was correctly convened, and that we have jurisdiction over the appeal, the
appropriate disposition in the light of Mathews v. Lucas,
plainly would be to affirm the judgment entered in this
case in favor of the Secretary. Assuming, on the other
hand, that we lack jurisdiction because the 3-judge court
was needlessly convened, the appropriate disposition
would be to dismiss the appeal. When an appeal to
but does not sa,y it ma,y enjoin him, and, moreover, in this statutory structure an injunction is out of place. Second, although the
suit was made to sound as a class action, the class was not properly
certified, inasmuch .as there was no allegation that the members had
· even filed applications for benefits; thus there is no jurisdiction over
the cla,ss aspects of the case. Weinberger v. Sdlfi, 422 U. S. 749
(1975), is cited. Smce only the individual claim remains, even if
injunctive power were available under § 405 (g), it would not be
appropriately exercised in review of a single claimant's case.
The appellant contends in rebuttal that the "affirming, modifying,
or reversing" language in § 205 (g) does not withdraw a district
court's general and inherent eqmty powers, including the power to
enjoin, and that, in any event, jurisdiction remains under the othercited statutes.
7 The respective jurisdictional statements for the original appeal
and for the present one preserved appellant's statutory claim along
with his constitutional contention. The statutory claim, however,
was not pressed in appellant's brief in the present case, and at oral
argument is explicitly was abandoned. Tr. of Oral Arg. 5-6.
We note, too, that, in contrast to the situation in Weinberger v.
Salfi, 422 U. S. 749, 763 n . 8 (1975), there is no jurisdiction here
nnder 28 U. S. C. § 1252 smce the District Court's decision was in
favor of the statute's constitutionality.

74-6212-0PINION

NORTON v. MATHEWS

1

this Court is sought from an erroneously convened 3judge District Court, we retain the P<>wer "'to make
such eorrective order as may be appropriate to the enforcement of the limitations' " which 28 U. S. C. § 1253
imposes. Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U. S. 31, 34 (1962),
quoting Gully v. Interstate Natural Gas Co., 292 U. S.
16, 18 (1934). What we have dooe recently, and in most
such cases where the j urisdidional i~Mue was previously
unsettled-and we do not imply that our doing so is
statutorily or otherwise compelled-has been 'k> vaeate
the District Court jud~rnent and remand the case for
the entry of a fresh decree from which an appeal may bey~""
taken to the appropriate eourt of appeals. Gonzales v.
Employee• Credit Union, 419 U. S. 00, 101 (1914), is
an example. In the present cue, however, the deeision
in ~ bas rendemd the ootl8titutional Wmet!l insubstantial ud !0 much so u not even to support the juri&-o
dietion of a 3-ju• District Court to oonsider their
mel'it's on remand. See, e. g., Hid'& v. Miramla, 422
U. S. 382, ~ (1975); HogtJm v. Lavine, 415 U. 8.
528, 586-338 (1974). Thus, there ia no point in remand·
in1 to enable the merits to be considered by a eourt of
appeals. See Mc:Lttros v. DeChamplain, <&2'1 U. S. 21
(1975).8
ln McLU(-118 a single district judge enjoined the enforcement ·of
Art. 134 of the Unifuftn Code of Military Ju.stiee, )0 U.S. C. § 934,
without convening s 3·iudge eottrt. He did so because he considered
the oonstitutional infirmity o-f the Article to be plain. See Bailey v.
Patterson, 369 U.S. 31 (1962}. On direct apPffil, under 28 U. 8. C.
§1252, the propriety of pl'lnedint; without a 3-)ttdge court was
questiolled. We observed that if a 3-judge court was ori~mally re3

Qllired 1111lder 28 U.S. C.§ 2282, we ordinarily were bound to vaeate
the judgmeat and remand for the convenilll of a 3-judge court.
Flemming v. Neltor, 363 U. S. 603, 607 (1960); Federul Houing

Inc., 3&2 tJ. S. 97? ~195n, ~n·
eluding, howe\W, that no pufPO!le could 'be sewed by decidillJ

Admi~tration v. f'Ae DuTlingtOft,

74-6212-0PINION
NORTON v. MATHEWS

It thus is evident that, whichever disposition we undertake, the effect is the same. It follows that there is no
need to decide the theoretical question of jurisdicti~ in
this case. In the past, we similarly have reserved difficultll uestions of our jurisdiction when the case a ternatlv'~ly could be resolved on the merits in favor of the
same party. See &cretary of the Navy v. Avrech, 418
U . S. 676 (1974). The Court has done this even when
the original reason for granting certiorari was to resolve
the jurisdictional issue. See United States v. Augenblick, 393 U. S. 348, 349-352 (1969). Although such
a disposition would not be desirable under all circumstances, we perceive no reason why we may not so proceed in this case where the merits have been rendered
plainly insubstantial. Cf. McLucas v. DeChamplain,
421 U. S., at 32. Making the asumption, then, without
deciding, that our jurisdiction in this cause is established, we aft'rm· the judgment in favor of the Secretary
~n the basis of our decision in Mathews v. Lucas, ante.

It is so ordered.

whether a 3-judge court was required origimily, because intervening
decisions of this Court sustaining the constitutionality of Art. 134
had rendered the merits issue plainly insubstantial by the time the
case was before us, we vacated the judgment and remanded the
case, directing dismissal. 421 U. S., at 32.
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I.a., d .J.,..o~
~"Ntd.~~
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~u:vrtmt <!fcurt cf tqt ~ttitth ~tatts
'~lhtsqi:nghtu. !f}. <!f. 2ll,?J!.~

CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

June 7, 1976

Re: No. 74-6212, Norton v. Mathews
Dear Harry,
My Conference notes indicate that a
majority voted to dismiss this appeal for lack
of jurisdiction. Accordingly, ;I shall await a
further expression of views on that subject.
Sincerely yours,

Mr. Justice Blackmun
Copies to the Conference

)

;§u:prttnt

<!Jomt ttf tlrt ~ta ;§tatts

jiasfting~ ~.

<!f. 2llbi~'

CHAMBERS OF"

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

June 11, 1976

Re:

/

No. 74-6212 - Norton v. Mathews

Dear Harry:
My recollection of the Conference vote in this case
is, like Potter's, that there was a majority to dismiss
for want of jurisdiction. If there is no longer a majority
which feels that the opinion should be written that way,
I will of course join you.
Sincerely,~

Mr. Justice Blackrnun
Copies to the Conference

.:§u:vrtmt \!fcurt cf tqt ~nittlt .;§tates
Jl~:ts!ringhttt. ~. \!f. 20~){.~

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE

June 14, 1976

Re:

No. 74-6212 - Norton v. Mathews

Dear Harry:
Please state at the foot of your opinion
in this case that I join the opinion of the Court
with the reservations stated in my concurring
statement in No. 75-88, Mathews v. Lucas.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Blackmun
Copies to Conference

.iUVt"tntt (!Jcurt cf Urt ~tritt~ ,jtatts
Jfasfri:ttghm. ~. <!f. 2ll&fJ!.~
CHAMBERS O F

..JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

June 22, 1976

Re: No. 74-6212, Norton v. Mathews
Dear Harry,
I am glad to join your opinion for the
Court in this case.
Sincerely yours,

Mr. Justice Blackmun
Copies to the Conference

,jnprttttt <!Jltttrlof tift '~Uritta ~fattg

..asfri:ttg~ ~. <!J. 2.0~~~
CHAMBER S OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST

June 22, 1976

Re:

No. 74-6212 - Norton v. Mathews

Dear Harry:
Please join me.

Mr. Justice Blackmun
Copies to the Conference

I

j)n;rrnttt <!Jonrl of Hr~ ~~ ~taftg
~u£ri:n:ghtn. ~. <!J. 2ll~'l>~
CHAMBERS OF

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

Re:

June 25, 1976

74-6212 -Norton v. Mathews

Dear Harry:
I join your June 1 proposed opinion.

Mr. Justice Blackmun
Copies to the Conference

.§u:pnmt <!Jou:rt of tJrt ~nitc~ .§tatte
~agJrington. tB. <!J. 206fJ!.~
CHAMBERS O F

JU S TICEWM . J . BRE NNAN , JR .

June 28, 1976

RE: No. 74-6212

Norton v.Mathews

Dear John:
Please join me in your diss enting opinion in the
above.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Stevens
cc: The Conference

'I

~u:pumt <!}curt of tlrt 1Jlttittb ~tatts

~atlfringtcn.

18. <!}.

20.;tJ!.;t

CHAMBERS OF"

J USTICE BYRON R . WHITE

June 28, 1976

Re:

No. 74-6212 - Norton v. Mathews
No. 75-88
- Mathews v. Lucas

Dear Harry:
If I have not before made it clear, I join
your opinions in these cases and withdraw any
concurring opinions or statements previously circulated.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Blackmun
Copies to Conference

,®u:pumt <!Jond of tlp~ 1futtttb .§taftg

'llJasltingfon, gl. \!}. :We?'~~
CHAMBERS OF

June 28, 197 6

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

Re: No. 74-6212. Norton v. Mathews

Dear John:
Please join me in your dissent.
Sincerely.

?!It;.
T. M.
Mr. Justice Stevens
cc: The Conference
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